a. p and q are contradictories iff i. p and q cannot both be true, and a and o are contradictories ii. necessarily, either p or q is true.
e and i are contradictories b. p and q are contraries iff i. p and q cannot both be true, and ii. p and q can both be false.
a and e are contraries c. p and q are subcontraries iff they are the contradictories of a pair of contraries. That is, p and q are subcontraries iff i. p and q cannot both be false, and ii. p and q can both be true i and o are subcontraries
Syllogistic Figures
• 'P' represents the predicate of the conclusion (major term), and 'S' represents the subject of the conclusion (minor term). Aristotle calls these terms the "extremes."
• 'M' represents the term that is common to the premises but absent from the conclusion. Aristotle calls this the "middle term."
• Aristotle calls the premise containing 'P' the "major premise," and the premise containing 'S' the "minor premise."
• '*' represents any of the four quantity/quality indicators ('a', 'e', 'i', 'o'). 
Syllogistic Moods
When we replace each '*' with a quantity/quality indicator we get a triple of propositions, <major premise, minor premise, conclusion>. Each distinct triple (e.g., <a,a,a>, <e,i,o>, etc.) constitutes a mood. (Aristotle, however, did not call these 'moods'; this expression is due to later commentators.)
There are 64 such moods (4 3 = 64). Each mood can occur in each of the three figures. Hence, there are 3 x 64 = 192 candidate syllogisms among the various mood/figures.
Each candidate syllogism can be labeled as to mood and figure as in the following example:
GaF GeH
FeH
The mood is <a,e,e>, and the figure is the second; we can abbreviate this as <a,e,e>-2
Aristotle attempts to identify and prove the validity of the syllogisms ( = valid mood/figures) and to identify and show the invalidity of the others. [More precisely, he attempts to show which premise-pairs do, and which do not, yield syllogistic conclusions; to prove the validity of those that do; and to show (by counterexample) the invalidity of those that do not.]
The Valid Moods
Aristotle recognizes the following as syllogisms (i.e., as valid moods): Aristotle excludes these from among the valid syllogisms not because they require existential import, but because their premises support stronger (universal) conclusions than the (particular) ones claimed here.
First
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Example at 26 a 36-38:
"Suppose that B belongs to no C, and that A either belongs or does not belong to some B or does not belong to every B; there will be no deduction in this case either. Let the terms be white-horse-swan, and white-horse-raven."
We have been given two premise-pairs of the first figure, <i,e> and <o,e>:
Case 1 Case 2
Premises AiB AoB BeC BeC There are four candidate syllogisms in each case:
Aristotle gives two sets of values for the variables. The first set has a positive relation between A and C; the second set has a negative relation between A and C.
Positive relation: Negative relation:
A = white A = white B = horse B = horse C = swan C = raven
The swan example (positive relation) disproves the four candidates with negative conclusions.
The raven example (negative relation) disproves the four candidates with positive conclusions. So Aristotle in effect gives us counter-examples to all eight candidates. In every case, the premises are true and the conclusion is false, so none of the candidates is a syllogism:
Case 1 Case 2
Major premise Some horse is white Some horse is not white r may be inferred from the premise-pair {p, q}, if either the contradictory or the contrary of q has been inferred from the premise-pair {p, the contradictory of r}.
That is, to prove a syllogistic conclusion, show that the assumption of its contradictory (along with one of the premises) leads to the contradictory or the contrary of the other premise.
[Examples of reduction per impossibile: For the contradictory of q inferred from {p, the contradictory of r}, see 28 b l7-18. For the contrary of q inferred from {p, the contradictory of r}, see 29 a 37-39.] <p, q, r> is a syllogism iff it is a mood of one of the three figures and r is deducible from {p, q} by the rules above.
Aristotle eventually shows how Darii and Ferio can be obtained as derived rules and hence dropped from the set of primitive rules (cf. 29 b 1-25).
8. Some Proofs of Syllogisms (texts omitted in Fine/Irwin) a. Cesare (27 a 5-9)
"Let M be predicated of no N but of every X. Then, since the privative converts, N will belong to no M. But M was assumed to belong to every X, so that N belongs to no X (for this has been proved earlier b. Camestres (27 a 9-13) "Next, if M belongs to every N but to no X, then neither will N belong to any X. For if M belongs to no X, neither does X belong to any M; but M belonged to every N; therefore, X will belong to no N (for the first figure has again come about). And since the privative converts, neither will N belong to any X, so that there will be the same deduction. (It is also possible to prove these results by leading to an impossibility.)"
NeX 4 e-Conversion c. Baroco (27 a 36-b 1)
"Next, if M belongs to every N but does not belong to some X, it is necessary for N not to belong to some X. For if it belongs to every X and M is also predicated of every N, then it is necessary for M to belong to every X: but it was assumed not to belong to some. And if M belongs to every N but not to every X, then there will be a deduction that N does not belong to every X. (The demonstration is the same.)"
MoX Premise "When both P and R belong to every S, it results of necessity that P will belong to some R. For since the positive premise converts, S will belong to some R; consequently, since P belongs to every S and S to some R, it is necessary for P to belong to some R (for a deduction through the first figure comes about). It is also possible to carry out the demonstration through an impossibility or through the setting-out (ekthesis). For if both terms belong to every S, then if some one of the Ss is chosen (for instance N), then both P and R will belong to this; consequently, P will belong to some R."
i. "The particular deductions in the first figure are brought to completion through themselves, but it is also possible to prove them through the second figure, leading away to an impossibility. For instance, if A belongs to every B and B to some C, we can prove that A belongs to some C. For if it belongs to no C and to every B, then B will not belong to any C (for we know this through the second figure) ." "If A belongs to no B and B to some C, then A will not belong to some C. For if it belongs to every C but to no B, then neither will B belong to any C (this was the middle figure) ." Notice all the logical relationships contained in this diagram: a and o are contradictories (always have opposite truth-values), as are e and i. a logically implies i, and e logically implies o. a and e are contraries (can't both be true, but may both be false), while i and o are subcontraries (can't both be false, but may both be true).
Aristotle's square of opposition is notoriously out of step with the "modern" square. That is, when Aristotle's a, e, i, and o propositions are "translated" in a standard way into the notation of contemporary first-order logic, these traditional relationships of entailment and contrariety do not survive.
b. The modern square: a e i o
All that remains of the traditional square is that a and o are contradictories, and that e and i are contradictories. That is because the "modern" versions of these propositions look like this:
The cause of the discrepancy is that the FOL versions of a and e propositions lack "existential import." That is, ∀x (Fx → Gx) and ∀x (Fx → ¬Gx) are both true when ¬∃x Fx is true, that is, when there are no Fs. (These are the so-called "vacuously true" universal generalizations.) So 'All Fs are Gs', on the modern reading, does not imply that there are Fs, and so does not imply that some Fs are Gs. The simplest way to bring the ancient and modern squares into line is to assume that Aristotelian syllogistic is intended to be used only with non-empty predicates. If we assume that 'F' and 'G' are non-empty, we can keep the standard FOL translations of the four Aristotelian forms:
Each of the four propositions is now taken to presuppose that the letters F, G, etc. are assigned non-empty sets.
Presupposition vs. Entailment
P entails Q If Q is false, P is false.
P presupposes Q
If Q is false, P is neither true nor false.
The presupposition assumption, at a single stroke, disables all the counterexamples to the traditional entailment and contrariety relations. For the only way in which the FOL version of a (or e) could be true while i (or o) is false is if there are no Fs. Likewise, the only way in which a and e could both be true (or i and o both false) is if there are no Fs. So if the syllogistic propositions presuppose that there are Fs, there are no counterexamples.
This simple solution reinstates all the traditional relationships of contrariety, subcontrariety, and implication. But there are shortcomings with this approach, as well. For it is not enough to say that each simple predicate we use must be non-empty; we will also have to require that any logical operation we perform on predicates will also yield a non-empty result.
For example, 'swan' is non-empty, and so is 'black'. But suppose that, in fact, all swans are white. Still, we can conjoin the predicates 'swan' and 'black' to get 'black swan'. This compound predicate is as a matter of fact empty. So we cannot allow it to be the subject of an a proposition, or else we will get embarrassing results. For if "all black swans have long necks" is true, then (since a implies i) so is "some black swans have long necks" and hence we are committed to the existence of black swans. But if "all black swans have long necks" is false, then (since a and o are contradictories) "some black swans don't have long necks" is true, and once again we are committed to the existence of black swans.
Thus we will have to say that syllogistic simply does not apply to such sentences. But the emptiness of 'black swan' seems to be a factual matter. And should the applicability of an inferential system depend on such things? This seems to bring too much of the world into the logical system. We may only discover the emptiness of the
implies implies
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Still, there are some textual reasons that favor this approach. First, there is the fact that Aristotle frequently paraphrases o as 'G belongs to not every F', i.e. , as the explicit contradictory of a. Second, there are these passages:
"If Socrates does not exist, 'Socrates is ill' is false" (Categories 13b18).
"If Socrates does not exist, 'Socrates is not ill' is true" (Categories 13b26).
These examples show that Aristotle is willing to assign a truth value to a sentence with a non-denoting singular term as subject. This suggests that he would be willing to do the same for an a-proposition with an empty subject term. This amounts to a rejection of the presupposition approach, and hence favors the Revised Modern Square.
implies implies
